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For decades, cognitive adaptation to response conﬂict has been considered to be the
hallmark of cognitive control. Notwithstanding a vast amount of evidence ruling out low-
level interpretations of these ﬁndings, disbelief still exists with regard to the underlying
cause of the observed effects. Especially when considering cognitive adaptation to
unconscious conﬂict, it is still a matter of debate whether repetitions of features between
trials might explain this intriguing ﬁnding rather than the involvement of unconscious
control. To this purpose, we conducted two masked priming experiments in which four
different responses to four different stimuli were required. This allowed us to completely
eliminate repetitions of prime and target over consecutive trials. Independent of whether
conﬂicting information was presented clearly visible or almost imperceptible, the results
showed an unexpected pattern. Contrary to the regular congruency sequence effect (CSE;
i.e., classic Gratton effect), in both experiments the congruency effect increased following
incongruent trials. Interestingly, this reversed effect completely disappeared when we
eliminated all trials with feature repetitions from the analysis. A third experiment, in which
feature repetitions were excluded a priori, showed a small but regular CSE in the error
rates only. Given that feature repetitions are theoretically thought to create a regular CSE,
our results are not in line with an interpretation in terms of feature repetitions nor with
an interpretation in terms of cognitive control. We conclude that examining cognitive
adaptation with or without feature repetitions might be more difﬁcult to conceive than
is often suggested in the literature.
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INTRODUCTION
In the search for the limits and possibilities of unconscious pro-
cessing, cognitive control processes have been studied extensively.
These processes, which make it possible to behave appropri-
ately in constantly changing environments (e.g., Botvinick et al.,
2001), are traditionally thought to require consciousness (Dehaene
and Naccache, 2001; Jack and Shallice, 2001). To experimentally
test this theoretical assumption, conﬂict tasks have often been
used. In these tasks, participants need to respond to relevant
stimulus features while ignoring irrelevant features. For exam-
ple, in the priming paradigm, participants need to identify a
target while ignoring a preceding prime. The relation between
the prime and the target is manipulated to create conﬂict and
non-conﬂict trials. On conﬂict (also termed incongruent) tri-
als, the prime and target trigger a different response while on
non-conﬂict (also termed congruent) trials both prime and tar-
get trigger the same response. Responses are typically slower
and error rates higher on incongruent compared to congru-
ent trials (i.e., the congruency effect). Interestingly, participants
adapt their behavior after encountering conﬂicting information,
leading to a decrease in the congruency effect. In a semi-
nal study, Gratton et al. (1992) observed that the congruency
effect is sharply reduced when the previous trial is incongru-
ent compared to congruent. This congruency sequence effect
(CSE) is also called the Gratton effect (Gratton et al., 1992).
Although the Gratton effect has been studied the most and
is a robust ﬁnding in different kinds of conﬂict tasks, it is
just one speciﬁc kind of CSE. In theory, also other modula-
tions of the congruency effect can potentially occur, and hence
be called CSE. Therefore, in the following, we will refer to
the Gratton effect as a ‘regular CSE’ and to all other kinds
of sequential modulation of the congruency effect as ‘irregular
CSE.’ To explain the occurrence of a regular CSE, it is typi-
cally assumed that if participants experience conﬂicting response
activations, they try to reduce the inﬂuence of the conﬂict-
ing information on subsequent occasions, by focusing more on
the relevant stimulus features and/or ignoring irrelevant fea-
tures (Botvinick et al., 2001). This leads to conﬂict adaptation:
enhanced performance on incongruent trials and reduced perfor-
manceon congruent trials, leadingoverall to a reduced congruency
effect.
The regular CSE is traditionally considered to be a result of
cognitive control processes (Botvinick et al., 2001), which are
assumed to require consciousness (Dehaene and Naccache, 2001;
Jack and Shallice, 2001). To get a better grasp on the possibility of
unconscious cognitive control, researchers have studied whether
this regular CSE still occurs when the conﬂicting information
remains unconscious. Results of this approach, however, are not
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unambiguous (for a review see Desender and Van den Bussche,
2012; Kunde et al., 2012).While some researchers argue that aware-
ness of the irrelevant information (e.g., the prime) is a prerequisite
for this effect to occur (Greenwald et al., 1996; Kunde, 2003; Frings
and Wentura, 2008; Ansorge et al., 2011), others have found a
reliable regular CSE even when the prime remained unconscious
(van Gaal et al., 2010; Desender et al., 2013). These latter ﬁndings
suggest that unconscious cognitive control is possible. However,
recently it has been challenged whether performance on conﬂict
tasks can be used as an index of cognitive control processes at
all. Unlike the long-held assumption that the regular CSE reﬂects
cognitive adaptation to conﬂicting information (i.e., conﬂict mon-
itoring account ; Botvinick et al., 2001), it has been argued that this
effect can be explained by low-level feature repetitions without the
need for control processes (i.e., feature repetitions accounts; Mayr
et al., 2003; Hommel et al., 2004; Schmidt, 2013). Hitherto, sev-
eral explanations of the regular CSE in terms of feature repetitions
have been proposed. For example, according to Mayr et al. (2003),
repetition priming effects (e.g., Pashler and Baylis, 1991) under-
lie the regular CSE. They pointed out that in a two-alternative
forced choice task 50% of II (i.e., an incongruent trial followed
by an incongruent trial) and CC (i.e., a congruent trial followed
by a congruent trial) trials are complete repetitions. CI (i.e., a
congruent trial followed by an incongruent trial) and IC (i.e., an
incongruent trial followed by a congruent trial) trials, on the other
hand, can never be complete repetitions. Thus, the regular CSE can
be explained as a superior performance on II and CC trials due
to repetition priming effects. In support of this idea, Mayr et al.
(2003) observed a regular CSE when all trials were analyzed but
this effect was no longer present after removing all target rep-
etitions (i.e., consecutive trials in which the target is the same)
from the analysis. In a similar vein, Hommel et al. (2004) claimed
that feature repetitions underlie the regular CSE. They argued
that stimulus and response features are combined in an event ﬁle
(i.e., a common episodicmemory representation,Hommel, 1998).
Whenever one of these two features is the same as in the previous
trial, this event ﬁle is reactivated, automatically activating both
features on the current trial. This is beneﬁcial when both features
are indeed repeated on that trial (i.e., complete S-R repetition).
On the other hand, when none of the features is repeated (i.e.,
complete S-R alternations) no event ﬁle will be reactivated, thus
no wrong activation needs to be suppressed and reaction times
(RTs) will also be fast in those cases. However, if only one of
both features repeats (i.e., partial S-R repetition) wrong activation
needs to be suppressed, which is detrimental for the performance.
Given that II andCC trials are always complete repetitions or com-
plete alternations in two-alternative forced choice tasks, responses
will be faster and more accurate on these trials compared to CI
and IC trials, which are always partial repetitions. According to
Hommel et al. (2004), these differences in performance lead to the
regular CSE.Although the gist of the arguments in terms of feature
repetitions is identical, the speciﬁc details slightly differ between
these theories. Hence it is important to rule out all possible sorts
of repetitions (i.e., complete as well as partial repetitions).
The debate between both interpretations of the regular CSE
(i.e., conﬂict monitoring account versus feature repetitions
accounts) has far-reaching consequences for the broad ﬁeld of
cognitive control, given that the effect is often considered as one
of the main expressions of cognitive control. Researchers have to
bear the alternative interpretations of the regular CSE in mind
when investigating cognitive control. Before any conclusions con-
cerning cognitive control processes can be drawn, confounding
inﬂuences of feature repetitions need to be ruled out. Therefore,
it is also crucial to take these alternative explanations into account
when studying the assumption that cognitive control processes
require consciousness. In the two studies reporting a reliable reg-
ular CSE for unconscious primes (van Gaal et al., 2010; Desender
et al., 2013) feature repetitions were not sufﬁciently controlled for.
Given that a two-alternative forced choice taskwas used, repetition
effects could not be fully ruled out (Egner, 2007; Mordkoff, 2012)
and theobserved effectsmightnot reﬂect apure conﬂict adaptation
effect. In general, the inﬂuence of feature repetitions in conﬂict
tasks is still a large matter of debate. Sometimes the effect vanishes
after controlling for the confound of repetitions (e.g., Schmidt and
DeHouwer, 2011), and sometimes the effect remains present (e.g.,
Kim and Cho, 2014; Schmidt and Weissman, 2014). Still, in none
of these studies the regular CSE was investigated in an uncon-
scious condition. It becomes clear that more research is needed in
which feature repetitions are controlled for, especially in theﬁeldof
consciousness.
In this study, three conﬂict tasks were set-up to thoroughly
test both interpretations of the regular CSE, while simultaneously
studying the inﬂuence of visibility of the conﬂicting information.
We used a priming paradigm with four stimuli and responses.
Using a four-alternative instead of a two-alternative forced choice
task enabled us to analyze the regular CSE before and after
removing all feature repetitions in a masked and unmasked con-
dition. If we would observe a regular CSE when the primes
are masked and if that effect would remain present after con-
trolling for feature repetitions, this would be support for the
possibility of unconscious cognitive control. However, if the
effect would no longer be present after controlling for this bias,
low-level processes (i.e., feature repetitions) instead of cognitive
control processes would seem to be the underlying cause of the
regular CSE.
EXPERIMENT 1
Experiment 1 is an extension of previous work (Desender et al.,
2013), with the modiﬁcation that we used four different stim-
uli and responses instead of two. In Experiment 1A, participants
completed a priming task using Arabic numbers as stimuli. In
Experiment 1B, participants performed a Stroop priming task
with color words as primes (e.g., “yellow”) and colored sym-
bols as targets (e.g., &&&&&; presented in yellow). In these
four-alternative forced choice tasks, we could eliminate fea-
ture repetitions. This enables us to investigate the contribution




Twenty-eight students participated in Experiment 1A. One partic-
ipant was eliminated because the mean error-rate was above 20%
and the mean RT was more than two SDs below the average mean.
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Another participant was eliminated because of a technical failure.
Thus, the ﬁnal sample of Experiment 1A consisted of 26 partici-
pants (23 females), with an age range of 18–27 years (M = 19.4,
SD = 2.0). 27 students (16 females) participated in Experiment
1B. The participants were between 17 and 22 years old (M = 18.9,
SD = 1.3).
All participants participated in exchange for course credit
and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Each signed an
informed consent before experimentation.
Apparatus and stimuli
Intel Pentium 4 computers with 17-inch LCD screens were used
to run the experiment. The refresh rate was set to 60 Hz and stim-
ulus presentation was synchronized with the vertical refresh rate
(16.7 ms). For stimulus presentation and data collection E-prime
version 1.1. was used. The data were analyzed using SPSS 19. All
stimuli were presented on a black background in the center of the
screen, using Arial, size 14.
In Experiment 1A, targets were the Arabic numbers “1,” “2,”
“8,” and “9.” Primes were the Arabic numbers “1,” “2,” “8,” “9,”
and the neutral prime “X.” The forward mask was “#$#” and
the backward mask was “$#$.” All stimuli were presented in
white. Each prime was combined once with a congruent tar-
get and once with an incongruent target1. The neutral prime
was combined with each possible target. As such, four congru-
ent (11, 99, 22, 88), four incongruent (19, 91, 28, 82) and
four neutral prime–target combinations (X1, X9, X2, X8) were
created.
In Experiment 1B, targets were strings of ﬁve colored amper-
sands. Four colors were used: yellow, blue, green, and red. The
Dutch names of the colors [geel (yellow), blauw (blue), groen
(green), and rood (red)] were printed in capital letters in gray and
used as primes. In this experiment the neutral prime was “££££.”
The forward mask was “#$#$#” and the backward mask was
“$#$#$.” Experiment 1B comprised four congruent (YELLOW–
yellow, BLUE–blue, GREEN–green, RED–red), four incongruent
(YELLOW–blue, BLUE–red, GREEN–yellow, RED–green) and
four neutral prime–target combinations (££££-yellow, ££££-blue,
££££-green, ££££-red).
Note that we had two categories of trials (i.e., combinations
of 1 and 9 and combinations of 2 and 8) in Experiment 1A
while in Experiment 1B the different stimuli were mixed to create
incongruent trials.
To fully control for feature repetitions, we consider each trial
where the identity of the prime and/or the target is the same as the
identity of the prime and/or the target of the previous trial as a
1This was done to avoid contingency biases. If we would fully cross all possible
stimulus combinations, each prime could be combined with three different incon-
gruent targets and only one congruent target. When in addition the congruent and
incongruent trials are balanced (i.e., each 50%) in the design, the primes are more
often combined with a congruent target than can be expected by chance (i.e., 25% in
our design), leading to higher contingency between this prime and target (Schmidt
and De Houwer, 2011; Mordkoff, 2012). If participants learn these contingencies,
this can lead to faster and more correct responses on high contingency trials relative
to low contingency trials (i.e., contingency effect; Schmidt et al., 2007). Moreover,
this contingency effect is smaller when the previous trial is a low contingency (or
incongruent) trial compared to a high contingency (or congruent) trial (Schmidt
et al., 2007). Thus, when contingency biases are not controlled for, the regular CSE
could reﬂect a sequential modulation of the contingency effect.
repetition (i.e., prime–prime, target–target, prime–target, target–
prime).
Procedure
In both experiments, all participants completed a practice block,
an experimental block and a posttest to assess prime visibility. All
these parts were completed once in themasked condition and once
in the unmasked condition.
Each trial started with a forward mask presented for 480 ms,
followed by a prime for 33 ms. Afterward, a backward mask
appeared for 67 ms in the masked condition, or a blank screen
in the unmasked condition. Finally, the target was presented
until a response was made. These speciﬁc timing parameters
were chosen because they proved effective in reducing prime
visibility in previous research (Desender et al., 2013). Partici-
pants needed to categorize the target as quickly and accurately
as possible. In Experiment 1A, participants had to press the
corresponding numerical key on the top of a standard qwerty
keyboard (“1” with the left middle ﬁnger, “2” with the left index
ﬁnger, “8” with the right index ﬁnger and “9” with the right
middle ﬁnger). In Experiment 1B, participants had to respond
by pressing the following keys on a qwerty keyboard: “d” with
the left middle ﬁnger for yellow ampersands, “f” with the left
index ﬁnger for blue ampersands, “j” with the right index ﬁn-
ger for red ampersands and “k” with the right middle ﬁnger for
green ampersands. Colored stickers were applied on each of these
keys to avoid any confusion. The inter-stimulus interval was set
to 1000 ms. In Figure 1, an example of an experimental trial is
shown.
Participants started the masked condition with eight practice
trials, during which no prime was shown. Afterward, they were
presented with 360 randomly selected experimental trials with
an equal amount of congruent, incongruent and neutral trials.
After the experimental trials, participants were informed about
the presence of the primes and they then completed a posttest
where they had to categorize the prime instead of the target. The
posttest comprised 120 trials, identical to the experimental trials
with the exclusion of neutral trials. Participants were instructed to
FIGURE 1 | Experimental procedure. Example of a congruent trial in the
masked condition.
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perform this task at their own pace. Next, participants performed
the same three parts in the unmasked condition.
RESULTS
Reaction times above 1000 ms and below 200 ms (2.1% of the
data in Experiment 1A; 4.1% in Experiment 1B), trials on which
an error was made (4.6% in Experiment 1A; 4.3% in Experiment
1B) and trials following an error (4.9% in Experiment 1A; 4.7%
in Experiment 1B) were excluded from further analysis. Mean RTs
of correct trials and mean error rates were submitted to a repeated
measures ANOVAwith current congruency (two levels: congruent
or incongruent)2, previous congruency (two levels: congruent or
2We initially included neutral trials in the experiments to be able to investigate
whether the regular CSE was caused by previous incongruent trials, previous con-
gruent trials or both (Desender et al., 2013). Because of the unexpected ﬁndings
reported below, these analyses were no longer useful. Therefore, we report only the
results of the analysis on congruent and incongruent trials. Note, however, that
conceptually the same results were obtained when including neutral trials in the
analysis.
incongruent) and visibility (two levels: unmasked or masked) as
within-subject factors.
Reaction times
In Experiment 1A, this analysis showed a main effect of current
congruency [F(1,25) = 196.99, p< 0.001] with faster average RTs
on congruent (511 ms) compared to incongruent trials (577 ms).
There was an interaction between visibility and current congru-
ency [F(1,25) = 139.16, p < 0.001], indicating larger congruency
effects in the unmasked (111 ms) than the masked condition
(22 ms). The interaction between visibility and previous con-
gruency was also signiﬁcant [F(1,25) = 4.75, p = 0.039]. The
difference in RTs after previous congruent and previous incon-
gruent trials was larger in the unmasked (537 ms versus 544 ms)
compared with the masked condition (550 ms versus 547 ms).
Crucially, there was an interaction between current congruency
and previous congruency [F(1,25) = 6.78, p = 0.015] which was
not modulated by visibility (F < 1; see Figure 2). Follow-up anal-
yses showed that the congruency effect was always larger following
an incongruent trial compared to a congruent trial [i.e., irregular
FIGURE 2 | Mean reaction times (RTs; lines) and error rates (bars) as a
function of previous and current congruency in Experiment 1A.
(A) Results of all trials (left) and non-repetition trials (right) in the masked
condition. (B) Results of all trials (left) and non-repetition trials (right) in the
unmasked condition. Error bars reﬂect 95% within-subject conﬁdence
intervals (see Masson and Loftus, 2003).
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CSE; 29 ms versus 13 ms, t(25) = −2.49, p = 0.020 in the masked
condition; 120 ms versus 103 ms, t(25) = −1.73, p = 0.097 in
the unmasked condition]. To examine the effects of feature repeti-
tions on this unexpected sequential modulation of the congruency
effect, we conducted the same analysis after eliminating all trials
where the identity of the prime and/or the target of the current
trial was the same as the identity of the prime and/or the target of
the previous trial (i.e., 43.3% of all trials). We retained on aver-
age 90 (SD = 6.7) trials per participant in the masked condition
and 88 (SD = 5.7) in the unmasked condition. Importantly, the
crucial interaction between current congruency and previous con-
gruency, indicating a CSE, was no longer signiﬁcant (F < 1; see
Figure 2).
The results of Experiment 1B were in line with Experiment 1A.
A similar main effect of current congruency [F(1,26) = 14.28,
p = 0.001] and interaction between visibility and previous con-
gruency [F(1,26) = 10.02, p = 0.004] was observed. As in
Experiment 1A, the crucial interaction between current congru-
ency and previous congruency was signiﬁcant [F(1,26) = 91.05,
p < 0.001] and not modulated by visibility (F < 1). We
again always observed that congruency effects were sharply
enhanced following incongruent trials compared to congruent
trials [34 ms versus −24 ms; t(26) = −8.58, p < 0.001 in
the masked condition; 47 ms versus −22 ms; t(26) = −6.20,
p < 0.001 in the unmasked condition; see Figure 3]. After
removing all possible repetitions [we retained 85 (SD = 7.3)
trials in the masked and 80 (SD = 8.6) trials unmasked con-
dition], the interaction between current congruency and pre-
vious congruency again was no longer signiﬁcant (F < 1; see
Figure 3).
Error rates
In Experiment 1B, this analysis showed a main effect of visibil-
ity [F(1,25) = 17.66, p < 0.001], with participants making more
errors in the unmasked (6.7%) compared to the masked condi-
tion (4.3%). We observed a main effect of current congruency
[F(1,25) = 28.52, p < 0.001]: more errors were made on average
on incongruent (7.0%) than on congruent (4.0%) trials. There
was also an interaction between visibility and current congruency
[F(1,25) = 10.83, p = 0.003], reﬂecting the fact that the congru-
ency effect wasmore prominent for the unmasked (4.8%) than for
the masked condition (1.3%). Crucially, there was no interaction
between current and previous congruency (F < 1; see Figure 2).
None of the other effects reached signiﬁcance. After removing
all possible repetitions, the interaction between current congru-
ency and previous congruency was also not signiﬁcant (F < 1, see
Figure 2).
For Experiment 1B there was an interaction between visibility
and current congruency [F(1,26) = 14.36, p = 0.001]. The con-
gruency effect was larger in the unmasked (4.8%) compared to the
masked condition (1.3%). There was no interaction between cur-
rent and previous congruency [F(1,26) = 1.87, p = 0.18]. None of
the other effects reached signiﬁcance. After removing all possible
repetitions, the analysis showed no interaction between current
and previous congruency [F(1,26) = 2.19, p = 0.15; see Figure 3].
Prime visibility
Data of the masked condition showed that participants correctly
categorized primes in 33% of the posttest trials in Experiment
1A and in 38% of the posttest trials in Experiment 1B. This is
above chance level performance [i.e., 25%; t(25)= 4.78, p< 0.001
FIGURE 3 | Mean RTs (lines) and error rates (bars) as a function of
previous and current congruency in Experiment 1B. (A) Results of all trials
(left) and non-repetition trials (right) in the masked condition. (B) Results of all
trials (left) and non-repetition trials (right) in the unmasked condition. Error
bars reﬂect 95% within-subject conﬁdence intervals (see Masson and Loftus,
2003).
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in Experiment 1A; t(26) = 5.99, p < 0.001 in Experiment 1B].
Non-signiﬁcant correlations were found between the individ-
ual visibility measure and our index of the CSE (r = −0.12,
p = 0.55 in Experiment 1A; r = −0.08, p = 0.70 in Experiment
1B). In the unmasked condition, the average proportion of cor-
rectly categorized primes (77% in both experiments) was clearly
above chance level [t(25) = 17.34, p < 0.001 in Experiment 1A;
t(26) = 11.84, p< 0.001 in Experiment 1B]. Importantly, the vis-
ibility in the unmasked condition was signiﬁcantly higher than in
the masked condition [t(25) = −14.00, p < 0.001 in Experiment
1A; t(26) = −8.58, p < 0.001 in Experiment 1B].
DISCUSSION
In Experiment 1 we examined whether the regular CSE (i.e., the
Gratton effect) is caused by the monitoring of conﬂict (Botvinick
et al., 2001) or rather by the presence of feature repetitions
(Mayr et al., 2003; Hommel et al., 2004). To be able to test
both accounts, we used a masked priming paradigm with four
stimuli and four responses. By increasing the amount of stim-
uli and responses, we were able to compare the regular CSE in
all trials with the effect in non-repetition trials (i.e., the iden-
tity of the prime and/or the target of the previous trial was not
repeated on the current trial). Although we expected a regular
CSE (i.e., reduced congruency effect following an incongruent
trial compared to a congruent trial) we observed an opposite
pattern in the responses (i.e., increased congruency effect follow-
ing an incongruent trial compared to a congruent trial) when
analyzing all trials. This unexpected and irregular CSE cannot
be accounted for by the conﬂict monitoring theory (Botvinick
et al., 2001). According to this account, the sequential modula-
tion of the congruency effect is a consequence of an increase
in cognitive control following conﬂict. However, from this per-
spective it would be hard to explain the current increase of the
congruency effect following conﬂict. Furthermore, this effect dis-
appeared completely when analyzing non-repetition trials only.
Thus, as predicted by the feature repetitions account and in line
with the results of Mayr et al. (2003), we observed no regular
CSE when all feature repetitions were removed. This supports
the idea that feature repetitions inﬂuence the sequential mod-
ulation of the congruency effect. However, given that our full
dataset showed an irregular CSE, which is also not predicted by
this latter account, the absence of a regular CSE after remov-
ing all possible feature repetitions is no convincing evidence in
support of the feature repetitions account either. We can only
conclude with certainty that feature repetitions have an impact
on this irregular CSE. Hence, examining cognitive adaptation
with or without feature repetitions might be more difﬁcult to
conceive than is often suggested in the literature. Neither the
interpretation of the regular CSE in terms of repetition prim-
ing effects (Mayr et al., 2003), nor the interpretation in terms of
feature integration (Hommel et al., 2004) can explain the irreg-
ular CSE that we observed. According to both interpretations,
speciﬁc feature repetitions lead to a faster reaction on II and
CC trials, respectively, compared to CI and IC trials. This dif-
ference in RTs is considered to be the underlying source of the
regular CSE. However, this selective beneﬁt for II and CC tri-
als was not present in our results. In contrast, we found the
exact opposite pattern (i.e., slower reaction on II and CC tri-
als, respectively, compared to CI and IC trials). As Mordkoff
(2012) pointed out, there are different sorts of repetition tri-
als (i.e., complete repetition, partial repetition in which the
relevant or irrelevant information repeats, negative priming rep-
etitions in which the relevant information of the previous trial
becomes the relevant information on the current trial) and the
removal of all these trials affect the different trial types (i.e.,
II, CC, IC, CI) at varying degrees. Hence, when repetition tri-
als are included in the design, the proportion of repetition and
non-repetition trials differs for each trial type. These varying
inﬂuences of feature repetitions on each trial type can lead to
complex interactions affecting the overall pattern of responses.
In conclusion, the observed irregular CSE might be triggered
by these complex inﬂuences of feature repetitions. Therefore it
seems necessary for future studies to investigate the regular CSE
in a more ‘clean’ design where feature repetitions are excluded
beforehand. Such a straightforward approach seems even more
indispensable when considering that studies differ in which spe-
ciﬁc feature repetitions are removed, making these studies hard
to compare (Notebaert and Verguts, 2007). In some recent stud-
ies feature repetitions were already excluded a priori in the design
(Kim and Cho, 2014; Schmidt andWeissman, 2014). We also used
this approach in our second experiment in order to investigate
whether the regular CSE can be observed when feature repetitions
confounds are completely controlled for by excluding them by
design.
EXPERIMENT 2
In our ﬁrst experiment, we limited the analysis to non-repetition
trials to investigate the effects of feature repetitions. Although
this is a widely applied approach (e.g., Mayr et al., 2003; Kerns
et al., 2004; Ullsperger et al., 2005; Fernandez-Duque and Knight,
2008), it has its limitations. As previously discussed, even though
repetition trials are removed from the analysis, the presence of
these trials during the experiment could still have an overall inﬂu-
ence on the response tendencies of the participants. To preclude
every plausible inﬂuence of feature repetitions, we set up a second
experiment in which all possible repetitions (i.e., prime–prime,
target–target, prime–target, target–prime) were excluded before-
hand. In Experiment 2 we used the same design as in Experiment
1A, but in this case a trial from one category (e.g., 1–9) was always
followed by a trial from the other category (e.g., 2–8). As such, the




Twenty-one students (eight females) participated in exchange for
course credit. They provided written informed consent before
experimentation. One participant was eliminated because the
mean error-rate was above 20% and the mean RT was more
than two SDs below the average mean. Another participant was
eliminated because of a technical failure. Thus, the ﬁnal sample
consisted of 19 participants (seven females), with an age range of
18–25 years (M = 20.0, SD = 2.1). All participants had normal or
corrected-to-normal vision.
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Apparatus and stimuli
Apparatus and stimuli were the same as in Experiment 1. The pos-
sible prime–target combinations were the same as in Experiment
1A, thus for the congruent and incongruent trials we had two cat-
egories of trials (i.e., combinations of 1 and 9 and combinations
of 2 and 8). To create neutral trials, the neutral prime “X” was
combined with each possible target.
Procedure
In general, the same experimental procedure was used as in Exper-
iment 1A (see Figure 1). We did change the amount of trials in
the different parts of the experiment. In Experiment 2, the partic-
ipants were presented with eight practice trials, 384 experimental
trials and 80 trials in the posttest twice (i.e., once in the masked
and once in the unmasked condition). To avoid feature repetitions
a priori, we also changed the sequence of the trials. A trial of one
category was always followed by a trial of the other category. Par-
ticipants had to respond by pressing the corresponding button on
a Cedrus response box (type RB-840).
RESULTS
RTs above 1000 ms and below 200 ms (2.0% of the data), trials
on which an error was made (4.4%) and trials following an error
(5.3%) were excluded from further analysis. Mean RTs of correct
trials and mean error rates were submitted to a repeated measures
ANOVA with the same within-subject factors as in Experiment 1.
Reaction times
This analysis showed a main effect of current congruency
[F(1,18) = 69.76, p < 0.001], indicating that participants
responded slower to incongruent (541 ms) compared to congru-
ent trials (487 ms). The interaction between visibility and current
congruency was signiﬁcant [F(1,18) = 67.26, p < 0.001]; the
congruency effect was smaller in the masked (20 ms) than the
unmasked condition (89 ms). Crucially, the interaction between
current and previous congruency did not reach signiﬁcance
(F < 1), indicating the absence of a regular CSE (see Figure 4).
None of the other effects reached signiﬁcance.
Error rates
As in the RT-analysis, there was a signiﬁcant main effect of cur-
rent congruency [F(1,18) = 7.80, p = 0.012] with more errors
being made on incongruent (7.5%) compared to congruent trials
(3.8%). There was also a signiﬁcant main effect of previous con-
gruency [F(1,18) = 4.44, p = 0.049]: the error rates on the current
trial were higher when the previous trial was congruent (6.2%)
compared to incongruent (5.0%). There was a signiﬁcant interac-
tion between visibility and current congruency [F(1,18) = 5.59,
p = 0.030], reﬂecting that congruency effects were larger in the
unmasked condition (5.1%) than in themasked condition (2.2%).
The crucial interaction between current congruency and previous
congruency was not signiﬁcant [F(1,18) = 1.80, p = 0.197]. How-
ever, the three-way interaction was signiﬁcant [F(1,18) = 5.66,
p = 0.029]. Separate ANOVAs indicated that the interaction
between current and previous congruency was not signiﬁcant
in the masked condition (F < 1; see Figure 4), but was signiﬁ-
cant in the unmasked condition [F(1,18) = 4.83, p = 0.041; see
Figure 4].
Prime visibility
To assess prime visibility, we analyzed the average proportion of
correctly categorized primes in the posttest. In the masked condi-
tion, participants correctly categorized primes on 34%of the trials,
which is above chance level performance [i.e., 25%; t(18) = 2.83,
p = 0.011]. In the unmasked condition, the average proportion
of correctly categorized primes (88%) was clearly above chance
level [t(18) = 19.84, p < 0.001]. Importantly, the visibility in the
masked condition differed signiﬁcantly from the visibility in the
unmasked condition [t(18) = −19.47, p < 0.001].
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In spite of the large amount of research, it is still unclear whether
and how cognitive control and consciousness are linked. Many
researchers used conﬂict tasks and analyzed the presence of the
regular CSE (i.e., the Gratton effect) in conditions differing in
stimulus visibility. However, the results of these studies are not
unequivocal (for a review seeDesender andVandenBussche, 2012;
Kunde et al., 2012), making it hard to draw strong conclusions
on the consciousness-control link. In addition, some researchers
argue that the regular CSE does not truly reﬂect cognitive control,
making such conclusions even harder. These researchers suggested
that the regular CSE is a consequence of feature repetitions (Mayr
et al., 2003; Hommel et al., 2004) rather than cognitive control
FIGURE 4 | Mean RTs (lines) and error rates (bars) as a function of previous and current congruency in Experiment 2 in the masked (left) and
unmasked (right) condition. Error bars reﬂect 95% within-subject conﬁdence intervals (see Masson and Loftus, 2003).
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(Botvinick et al., 2001). We designed three priming experiments
to investigate whether the regular CSE is a consequence of cog-
nitive control, and if so, whether this effect also occurs when the
conﬂicting information is masked.
DOES THE GRATTON EFFECT REFLECT COGNITIVE CONTROL?
When restricting the analysis to non-repetition trials, we observed
no regular CSE in Experiment 1. As such, our results seem to
corroborate previous ﬁndings (Schmidt and De Houwer, 2011;
Mordkoff, 2012) in support of the feature repetitions account.
However, when all trials were analyzed, we did not observe a reg-
ular CSE either but a CSE characterized by an opposite pattern
of responses. This makes an interpretation of the regular CSE in
terms of feature repetitions not appropriate based on our data.We
can only conclude that feature repetitions seem to inﬂuence the
sequential modulation of the congruency effect in various ways.
As discussed before, the post hoc removal of feature repetitions
is not without problems. To overcome these limitations, feature
repetitions were precluded beforehand in some recent studies
(Kim and Cho, 2014; Schmidt andWeissman, 2014). In both stud-
ies, a reliable regular CSE was found. Like in our study, Schmidt
and Weissman (2014) used a priming paradigm, however, with
clearly visible primes only. To the best of our knowledge, we are
the ﬁrst to study the regular CSE in both a masked and unmasked
condition while controlling for feature repetition confounds. Our
analysis of the error rates of Experiment 2 revealed the presence of
a regular CSE in the unmasked condition. Although we have to be
cautious in interpreting this small effect, it suggests that cognitive
control can trigger a regular CSE when the conﬂicting informa-
tion is consciously perceived. In contrast to some previous studies
(van Gaal et al., 2010; Desender et al., 2013), our study failed to
provide evidence for conﬂict adaptation when the conﬂicting
information is masked. However, it is possible that the difference
between both conditions may be caused by a difference in the size
of the congruency effect rather than a difference in awareness. In
the masked condition the congruency effect was smaller, therefore
the amount of conﬂict might be too small to induce adaptation
processes. Furthermore, given that we only observed a small effect,
more research is needed to investigate whether our results can be
replicated.
Right now, we conclude that the effects of feature repetitions
might bemore complex thanpreviously suggested and that a‘clean’
design is needed to examine both competing accounts concerning
the regular CSE. Additionally, based on our second experiment
we cautiously conclude that there might be some evidence for a
regular CSE triggered by cognitive control if the conﬂicting infor-
mation is presented clearly visible. This questions the idea that the
regular CSE can solely be explained by feature repetitions. Egner
(2007) already suggested that neither account can fully explain all
the results that are found by different researchers. He points to the
possibility of a combination of different processes underlying the
regular CSE.
AN UNEXPECTED FINDING: AN INCREASED CONGRUENCY EFFECT
FOLLOWING CONFLICT
In Experiments 1A and 1B, we found an increased congruency
effect following an incongruent trial compared to a congruent
trial when including all trials in the analysis. As discussed before,
we did not anticipate this irregular CSE and neither the conﬂict
monitoring account (Botvinick et al., 2001) nor the feature repe-
titions accounts (Mayr et al., 2003; Hommel et al., 2004) can fully
explain this reversed effect.
Although this irregular CSE seems highly remarkable, a closer
look at the literature shows that at least in some studies this effect
was also observed (Fischer et al., 2008; Jiang et al., 2013). Fischer
et al. (2008) observed a reversed adaptation pattern when com-
paring adaptation to different kinds of conﬂict. Furthermore, in a
recent study using an affective priming paradigmwithmasked and
unmasked primes, Jiang et al. (2013) compared the regular CSE on
response alternation versus response repetition trials. When the
response of two consecutive trials was repeated, they observed the
same irregular CSE as we did. When the response alternated, they
observed a regular CSE (in the conscious condition only). They
proposed that the irregular CSE was a consequence of response
priming rather than emotional conﬂict, given that this effect only
occurred when analyzing the trials in which the response was
repeated. However, as suggested by Mayr et al. (2003), response
priming should result in a regular CSE, and not a reversed pat-
tern as Jiang et al. (2013) observed. In contrast to the results of
Jiang et al. (2013), we observed no regular CSE when analyzing
non-repetition trials in the current study. However, we observed
an irregular CSE in all trials. Given that response repetition as
well as response alternation trials are included in these analysis,
this irregular CSE cannot be exclusively attributed to response
priming, challenging the conclusion of Jiang et al. (2013). Further
research, where stimulus and response repetitions are properly
separated, is needed to understand these conﬂicting results.
Apart from these isolated studies, the irregular CSE that we
observed has also been observed in studies in which feature rep-
etitions are avoided by using two different tasks and/or responses
between which participants have to switch. For example, Verguts
and Notebaert (2008) found evidence for this reversed pattern of
responses when the task switches between two trials. In another
study participants had to switch between a vertical and horizontal
Simon task (Braem et al., 2011). Braem et al. (2011) observed a
regular CSE when participants had to respond to both the verti-
cal as well as the horizontal Simon task by pressing buttons with
their two hands. However, when they had to respond to one task
with their hands and to the other with their feet (i.e., two different
response modalities), they observed the same irregular CSE that
we did when the response modality switched. The results of both
studies are explained by an interpretation of the regular CSE in
terms of associative learning (Verguts and Notebaert, 2008, 2009).
When participants encounter conﬂict (i.e., incongruent trial), this
is assumed to result in a strengthening of the association between
the task-relevant units, which leads to reduced inﬂuence of irrel-
evant information on the following trial (Verguts and Notebaert,
2008, 2009). When stimulus-response associations of task 1 are
enhanced as a consequenceof conﬂict, the other stimulus-response
associations (including those of task 2) are weakened. Thus, there
is less attention for the relevant information of task 2 following
an incongruent trial of task 1, leading to the reversed pattern of
responses. In Experiment 1A of the current study, a prime from
one category (e.g., 1–9) was only combined with a target from
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the same category. Therefore, the irregular CSE could have been a
consequence of a switch between these two categories. We found
a reversed pattern of responses when all trials were analyzed and
no CSE after removing all feature repetitions. This suggests that
task switches only lead to the irregular CSE when feature repeti-
tions are included and that the effect vanishes when repetitions
are controlled for. This corroborates the ﬁnding of Kim and Cho
(2014), who did not observe a regular CSE when the response
mode switched (e.g., from right to left hand) in non-repetition
trials. However, it may be argued that an interpretation in terms
of task switches does not hold for the irregular CSE observed in
the current study. First, in Experiment 1B, the different stimulus-
options were mixed. In spite of not having two categories we still
observed a reversed pattern of responses. Second, it seems unlikely
that the participants would categorize the stimuli in these two cat-
egories (i.e., 1–9 and 2–8) in the masked condition given that
the primes are almost imperceptible. Nevertheless, we did ﬁnd a
reversed effect in this condition. Further research in which the
switches between such categories are manipulated is needed to
evaluate whether task switches could have had an inﬂuence in our
studies.
CONCLUSION
Based on the current results, we conclude that feature repetitions
have an inﬂuence on the sequential modulation of the congruency
effect. However, this inﬂuence seems more complex than previ-
ously suggested and might not be directly comparable to conﬂict
adaptation effects. Further research is needed to come to a better
understanding of the irregular CSE that we observed in our ﬁrst
experiment. Furthermore, to avoid all confounding inﬂuences of
feature repetitions, it is important to preclude all sorts of feature
repetitions in the design to circumvent the shortcomings of post
hoc removal of repetition trials. To be able to further unravel the
inﬂuence of cognitive control on the one hand and feature rep-
etitions on the other such designs will be crucial. In our second
experiment we used such a design and found limited support for
the role of cognitive control in the regular CSE. This was only
the case when the irrelevant information was presented clearly
visible. However, more research in which feature repetitions are
precluded in both an unmasked as well as masked condition is
needed to verify whether our results can be replicated.
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